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Abstract 
 The agricultural policies shift gradually from EU-level organised market interventions 
to local organised environmental policies. This paper explores the growth possibilities of the 
Flemish dairy sector with the outlook of a quota abolishment as a case study of this policy 
shift. The dairy quota policy seems very restrictive for the highly profitable Flemish dairy 
sector, but the environmental restrictions from the manure regulation can limit the growth of 
the dairy sector as well. The paper uses a spatial multi-agent simulation model applied to a 
sample of 40.000 farms to estimate price development of emission rights and their possible 
impact on the growth of the dairy production. The results show that a higher milk production 
leads to higher prices for emission rights. However, the increased cost of manure emission 
rights is not expected to impede dairy farm growth because the current milk quota rent 
estimates go far beyond the cost of manure emission rights. 
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Introduction 
Flanders is a region in Belgium (The Northern part) with an intensive agricultural 
sector. In 2005 Flanders has 34,410 farms with a total agricultural production value of 4.471 
billion €. The dairy sector is the third most important sub sector with a production value of 
552 million € (11.7% of the total agricultural sector). In 2005, 8,128 dairy farms were active, 
holding 308,883 cows with a total dairy quota of 1.940 billion litres. The Flemish dairy sector 
is believed to be one of the most competitive dairy sectors in Europe (Breen et al., 2008; 
Cathagne et al., 2006; Dillon et al., 2008; Thorne and Fingleton, 2006), but the quota 
regulations currently prevent an expansion of the Flemish dairy production.  
During the last year, signals from the European commission indicated that the milk 
quota is very likely to be abolished in 2015. The question is not if quota will be abolished but 
rather in which manner the quota this will happen. The most probable scenario is the so called 
soft-landing wherein milk quota are gradually enlarged from 2008 until 2015. Recently, the 
European council of agriculture has imposed a linear enlargement of the national quota in all 
member states with 2% from April 1st 2008.  
From a purely economic point of view, one could expect that in high profitability 
regions, the extra available quota will be used completely and from 2015 on a shift in milk 
production from regions with a low profitability to regions with a high profitability will occur, 
meaning that the Flemish dairy sector would benefit and the milk production will increase. 
Despite the high profitability of the Flemish dairy sector compared to other regions, growth in 
milk production is not guaranteed, because the environmental legislation is becoming more 
restrictive and because the dairy sector must compete with other agricultural sub sectors 
within Flanders as well. Flanders is a region with a highly intensive animal production (e.g. 
pork and poultry) (DeSmet et al., 1996; Sleutel et al., 2007). The import of feed compounds 
have led to an excess of nutrients in the Flemish region resulted in a high pressure on the 
environment (Feinerman and Komen, 2005). The constantly deteriorating water quality and 
the introduction of Nitrate directive (91/676/EEC) at European level has resulted in a rigorous 
environmental policy framework at Flemish level: the manure decree (Van der Straeten et al., 
2008). This decree regulates the manure disposition at farm level. Only a limited amount of 
manure can be spread on land according to the type of manure, the cultivated crop and the 
area. Basically, it works with a system of tradable emission rights where manure is labelled as 
the emission and where the right to spread manure on land is labelled as the emission right  
(Buysse et al., 2008). 
Since the introduction of the manure decree, manure emission rights have been 
restricted further whereas the demand for emission rights still increases. Experts indicate that 
the price of the emission rights have gone up. 
These increasing prices could hamper the expectations of a large increase of milk 
production in the Flemish region. The existence of this Flemish environmental legislation 
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means extra costs for the farmer. Producing more milk leads to a larger nutrient excretion and 
thus extra manure disposal costs. The expansion of milk production will only take place if the 
gains of one extra litre milk are larger than the prices paid for the corresponding nutrient 
emission rights.  
The tension between the drive to grow of a very competitive sector and the very 
restrictive environmental measures makes the Flemish dairy sector a good case to study the 
shift from price and market policies at European level to environmental policies more targeted 
at farm level. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to make an analysis at farm-level to 
asses the local impact of the EU quota enlargement in Flanders restricted by local policy 
measures, inspired by EU directives, and evaluate the repercussion at aggregated level.  
The next section explains the main principles of the Flemish manure legislation.  
 
The Flemish manure decree 
In Flanders, the first regulatory norms with respect to manure were imposed in 1991 as 
a result of the introduction of the Nitrate Directive (91/676/EEC)1. This manure decree 
regulates the manure allocation but has changed through the years several times (Vervaet et 
al., 2004). Since 2003 MAPIIbis was imposed and the last major reform was in 2007 by 
implementing MAP III. The basic idea of both manure decrees is given in Figure 1. 
                                                 
1
 The main purpose of the directive was to protect the waters against pollution caused by nitrates from 
agricultural sources  
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Figure 1: graphical representation of the structure of the manure decree 
The most common way to calculate the nutrient production of the farm is using the 
animal number per type of animal multiplied by a related fixed excretion norm2. The total 
nutrient availability at the farm can be increased/decreased by importing/exporting nutrients 
from/to other farms. The sum of both sources is the quantity of nutrients the farmer has to 
dispose. In order to do this, the farmer has three possibilities. He can transport it to other 
farms, he can process the manure or he can dispose it on his own land. The latter option is 
currently often the cheapest solution and, therefore, the most used one. This possibility is 
limited by the four imposed emission rights according to the type of manure, crop category3 
and area4. The use of organic nitrogen (N) and inorganic nitrogen are each bounded by a 
maximum norm. More-over the joint use of both nitrogen types is also bounded by a third 
emission right. Finally the farmer must apply to the fourth emission right which bounds the 
joint use of organic and inorganic phosphorus (P2O5). In this paper we only consider the three 
emission rights with respect to Nitrogen. When the farmer can not dispose all his manure on 
his own land he can try to obtain sufficient emission rights from other farms (i.e. transport 
                                                 
2
 Departures from the fixed norms are possible but they involve high transaction costs for the farm 
3
 The manure regulation subdivided crops into four different categories (grassland, corn, low nitrogen crops and 
other crops) 
4
 In the manure regulations distinction is made between general area’s and vulnerable area’s ( e.g. water, nature, 
phosphorus saturated area’s)  
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manure to other farms). Finally processing the manure is the most costly one and in practice 
this option is only chosen when other possibilities are exhausted. 
MAP IIbis was valid in the period 2003-2006 but was ineffective with respect to his 
main goal: improvement of water quality. Therefore, in 2007, a major policy change was 
implemented (MAP III). The structure of the manure decree remained unchanged but 
fertilization and excretion norms changed drastically because of new scientific evidence. The 
whole Flemish region became a vulnerable area, meaning that the maximum fertilization 
norm for manure is 170 kg nitrogen per hectare5 (Table 1 and Table 2). The excretion norms 
for most of the animal species decreased. For dairy cows, however, nutrient emission was 
made proportional to the cow productivity (equation 1):  
XY *008,050 +=      with (1) 
Y: N- excretion (Kg N/cow)  
X: cow productivity (litre milk/cow)   
In practice this means that the total nutrient excretion of dairy cows increased (under 
MAP II, the fixed norm was 97 kg nitrogen per year per cow).     
This change in policy had some serious consequences for the Flemish agricultural 
sector. Most farms experienced a decline of their emission rights and became a surplus farm6. 
At aggregated level emission rights became more scarce and prices went up. Especially at 
dairy farms the consequences are high. Dairy farms cultivate mainly grassland and maize: 
crops for which the drop in fertilization norms was the strongest. At the same time dairy 
farms experienced an increase in nutrient production resulting in a large excess of manure on 
these farms. 
 
Table 1: fixed general fertilization norms in kg/ha (*) (period 1/1/2003 until 31/12/2006) (MAP IIbis) 
(source: Vlaamse regering (2006)) 
Crop category
 
P2O5 Total N Organic N Inorganic N 
Grassland 130 500 250 350 
Maize 100 275 250 150 
Low N crops (**) 100 125 125 100 
Other crops (***) 110 275 200 200 
* Only the fertilization norms for the general areas are given. More stringent norms are imposed for 
vulnerable areas  
                                                 
5
 European commission allows derogation for certain crops (e.g. grassland and corn) under certain conditions. 
With derogation fertilization norms can departure from the fixed norms. This allows to dispose more nutrients on 
the land (Claeys et al., 2008) 
6
 Surplus farms produce more manure than they can dispose on their own land 
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**Crops with a low N demand, e.g. onions, chicory, clovers, fruit plantations, flowers,… 
***All crops not belonging to one of the 3 other categories, e.g. potatoes, sugar beets, cereals, legumes, … 
Table 2: fixed general fertilization norms in kg/ha (period from 1/1/2007) (MAP III) (source: Vlaamse 
regering (2006)) 
Crop category
 
P2O5 Total N Organic N 
(manure) 
Organic N 
(other) 
Inorganic N 
Grassland 100 350 170 170 250 
Maize 85 275 170 170 150 
Low N crops (*) 80 125 125 125 70 
Leguminose(**) 80 0 0 0 0 
Sugar beets 80 220 170 170 150 
Other crops (***) 85 275 170 170 175 
*Crops with a low N demand, e.g. onions, chicory, fruit plantations, flowers,… 
**leguminose: all leguminose with exception of peas and beans 
***All crops not belonging to one of the 3 other categories, e.g. potatoes, sugar beets, cereals, legumes, … 
 
Data 
We used two data sources. The first database has been set up by the Flemish 
controlling administration: the Flemish land agency (FLA). It contains all variables related to 
production, transactions, acquisitions and use of nutrients for each Flemish farm individually. 
The database contains the complete population of 44,796 farms over a period of four years 
(2002-2005) with a total of 179,764 unbalanced panel observations. The second database is 
set up by the Flemish Department of Agriculture and Fishery (DAF). This administrative 
database includes a population of 21,059 farms with 379,062 unbalanced panel observations 
(from 1988 until 2005). The dataset contains the quota size for each farm in each year.  
Because of complementary problems between DAF and FLA databases only 4,441 
dairy farms could be linked between both databases, i.e. almost 55% of the Flemish dairy 
farms in 2005. These farms produces 1.2 billion litres of milk (58% of the total Flemish milk 
production). 
 
Method 
The basic manure allocation model  
To capture the regional heterogeneity of manure production, a spatial mathematical 
programming Multi-Agent System model (MP-MAS) was developed. MAS offers the 
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possibility of representing the individuals, their behaviour and their interactions. It enables us 
to construct artificial micro-worlds in which one can control all the parameters at all levels 
(Courdier et al., 2002). The present approach uses MP to simulate farmer decision-making 
and to integrate this decision-making with the legal part of the model. MP has been 
implemented in MAS by several researchers, for instance by Balmann (1997), Berger (2001), 
Becu et al. (2003) and Happe (2004). The use of MP at the core of the decision-making 
procedure is suitable to capture agent heterogeneity and economic trade-offs while focussing 
on constraints has a clear link to policy relevant questions (Schreinemachers and Berger, 
2006). We assume an optimizing agent which minimizes his costs by allocating the manure in 
a normative way. The model consist of four major parts: legal descriptions, manure transport, 
manure abatement and cost-calculation. A more elaborated description of the model can be 
requested from the authors.  
Costs for each allocation-option are assumed to be fixed expressed per volume (m³) 
(Table 3). The simulation uses the four types of manure (bovine, pork, poultry and other) 
regarding nitrogen content per cubic metre (m³) (table 4). The combination of both 
assumptions imply that costs per kg nitrogen are different between the four types of manure.  
 
Table 3: assumed costs per allocation option 
 Costs 
Transport costs 0.12 €/m³/km 
Disposal costs 12.5 €/m³ 
Processing costs 22.5 €/m³ 
 
Table 4: assumed nitrogen content for each manure type  
 Nitrogen-content (kg N/m³) 
Bovine 4.8 
Pork 6.5 
Poultry 29.8 
Other 6 
 
Because of the differences in costs between the three allocation options and the 
differences in nitrogen content between the four types of manure, the allocation strategy will 
follow a certain pattern. The distribution option (i.e. dispose the manure on the land) is the 
cheapest option. When all the available emission rights are used, the farmer will search for 
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available emission rights at other farms. The final option is to process the manure. Manure 
from poultry has the highest nitrogen content, followed by pork, meaning that for these 
manure types, transport and processing costs per kg N are the lowest. The farmer will choose 
to dispose manure of bovine on his own land, followed by manure of other animals. 
 
The regional manure pressure 
The model takes the spatial and the regional aspects of manure production and manure 
disposition into account trough transport distances and costs. As the individual farms are 
optimising agents the model will search for the nearest located free emission rights. When a 
single surplus farm is situated nearby deficit farms, transport costs are low, however when a 
surplus farm is surrounded by other surplus farms, the transport distance to a deficit region 
will increase, resulting in an increasing transport cost per kg nitrogen.  
The larger the distance to a region with non-used emission rights, the higher the 
transport costs will be. In a region were farms are confronted with such a high transport cost, 
an extra emission right on the farm itself will cause the largest decrease in total costs. This 
phenomenon is captured by the manure allocation equation of the model (equation 2): 
∑ ≤
m
ofmf RU   [λ](2) 
With Umf  the use of manure type m (kg N) at farm f and Rof  the farm’ emission right for 
organic nitrogen. The dual variable of the equation (λ) is a measure for the manure pressure 
(Buysse et al., 2008). The manure pressure is the willingness to pay of the farmer to dispose 
one unit of nitrogen at the land of another farm, meaning transport costs plus an extra fee to 
the farmer to dispose manure on his land. This regional aspect allows us to simulate the 
behaviour of the farmer regarding its own farm situation and regional situation towards the 
manure problem.  
 
Linking milk production and manure pressure 
To capture the interaction between milk production and regional manure pressure an 
extra module is build in where the nutrient production per farm can be measured based on its 
milk production. A higher (lower) milk production leads to higher (lower) nutrient 
production, resulting in a higher (lower) manure pressure on dairy farms. As nutrient 
excretion is made linear to cow productivity, a higher milk production causes a higher 
nitrogen production. The higher milk production can be achieved by holding more cows, by 
increasing the average cow productivity or by a combination of both.   
The manure model works with the total farm population. As only 58% of the milk 
production is located in the model, it is necessary to adjust for the remaining 42%. The best 
 10
possible solution is to adjust on municipality level. For each province (5 in Flanders) the true 
milk production is known. Then, for each province the milk production in the sample is 
calculated and subtracted from the true milk production. The remaining volumes are divided 
among the municipalities proportionally to the share of allocated milk production in the 
respective province. For each municipality an extra farm was introduced which is assumed to 
produce this extra allocated milk production. The introduction of this farms assures the 
representatives of production and allocation of manure to correctly predict changes in manure 
pressure.  
Subject to the research question, two different approaches were used. With the first 
type of question one measures the effect on farm profitability of a quota enlargement of x% 
while the second type of questions measures the maximum possible quota enlargement given 
the sector profitability with respect to the environmental legislations. In the first approach a 
single iteration is performed where all farms will increase the milk production with x%. This 
approach is applied in section 5.1 and 5.2. In the second approach iterations are repeated n 
times. Two possible end-of-iteration criteria are built in: when the farm’ regional manure 
pressure becomes larger than the quota rent (i.e. the profit of the last produced litre) or when 
the land used by the farmer becomes restrictive, i.e. we assume that dairy cows are 50% of the 
time outside and this means that the farm must have enough pasture to dispose at least 50% of 
the total nitrogen production of dairy cows and the young cattle on own land. As long as the 
farm has not reached one of the two criteria the quota will be enlarged. The optimization ends 
when all farms have reached the end-of-iteration criteria or when the maximum number of 20 
iterations is exceeded. This approach is applied in section 5.3. 
 
Reference cows 
MAP II calculated nutrient excretion not made proportional to cow productivity, 
resulting in an equal nitrogen excretion for cows with different productivities and allocation 
costs per litre inversely proportional to the cow productivity. The MAP III policy calculates 
now nutrient excretion linear to the cow productivity, following equation 1. Based on this 
equation, highly productive cows excrete less nitrogen per produced litre of milk than low 
productive cows, but the advantage for farms with a high average productivity is lower then 
under MAP II. 
Because of this productivity-dependent effect, a reference productivity has to be taken. 
We make simulations with two different assumption of reference cows. Cow–6250, with a 
productivity of 6,250 litre milk a year. In MAP III the corresponding nitrogen excretion 
amounts for 100 kg per year. Cow–9375 with a productivity of 9,375 litre milk per year and a 
corresponding nitrogen production of 125 kg. 
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Results 
In the first part we analyse the sensitivity of the manure pressure indicator to the 
change in manure policy. In the second part we analyse if and in which extend the manure 
pressure, and thus the price of an emission right is influenced by a changing manure 
production. For that purpose, we use the case of an increasing dairy production. In the third 
part we calculated the possible growth in milk production in Flanders.  
 
Sensitivity of manure pressure to changing manure policy 
Table 5 gives the most important simulation results for MAP II and MAP III. 
 
Table 5: simulation results of a shift from MAP II to MAP III 
 Map II Map III 
Milk production (l) (*) 1,200,467,79
6 
1,200,467,79
6 
Nutrient excretion of dairy cows (kg N) (*) 14,597,067 15,687,721 
Average manure pressure (dairy farms) (€/kg N) 0.6887 1.3009 
lowest manure pressure (dairy farms) (€/kg N) 0.0000 0.0489 
highest manure pressure (dairy farms) (€/kg N) 2.0833 2.0833 
Average manure pressure (non- dairy farms) (€/kg N) 0.6092 1.0449 
Lowest manure pressure (non- dairy farms) (€/kg N) 0.0000 0.0356 
Highest manure pressure (non- dairy farms) (€/kg N) 2.0833 2.0833 
Average manure pressure (all farms) (€/kg N) 0.6297 1.1035 
(*) only dairy farms included in the sample 
 
The current milk production of the sample accounts for 1.2 billion litres of milk. 
Under MAP II, the cows excrete 14.6 million kg of nitrogen. Under MAP III this has 
increased with 1 million kg to 15.6 million kg. The introduction of MAP III has some serious 
consequences for all farms and in particular for dairy farms. The average price for emission 
rights increased in Flanders with 75%. Dairy farms are confronted with an increase in price of 
almost 90%. This strong increase in prices is caused by growth in demand for and the 
simultaneously decrease in the supply of emission rights. 
The average manure pressure on dairy farms under MAP III-policy is 1.3009 €/kg N. 
This means that in a perfect market the farmer would pay up to 1.3009 € to dispose 1 kg of 
nitrogen (transport costs included). Other farms (i.e. non-dairy farms) experience a lower 
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average manure pressure (1.0449 €/kg N). The reason for this lower manure pressure is the 
lower share of manure of type ‘bovine’ in these farms. Because of the low nitrogen content of 
this manure type, the allocation costs per unit of nitrogen are larger.  
To see what the shift in policy means for the farm profitability, one has to express the 
allocation costs per litre of produced milk. 
Changing from map II to map III increased the manure pressure on dairy farms from 
0.6887 to 1.3009, meaning the costs for manure allocation for cow-6250, increased from 
66.80 € to 130.09 €. Expressed per litre of milk produced, the average allocation costs 
increased from 1.07 eurocent per litre milk to 2.08 eurocent per litre (+94.4%).  
Cathange et al. (2006) have determined the average unit quota rent on the short, 
middle and long run for Belgian dairy farms. The long run quota rent, which is the lowest of 
the three and takes also land into account as a cost, is 9.1 eurocent per litre of milk. Despite 
the almost doubled prices for emission rights, the increase in average price is still much lower 
than the gain of the last produced litre of milk.  
 
Sensitivity of manure pressure to changing milk productions 
The results of the simulation are given in table 6.  
 
Table 6: simulation results of an increasing milk production, assuming a constant cow-productivity 
 Current 
production 
(2005) 
+1% +2% +5% +10% +20% 
Milk production (*) (1000 l) 1,200,468 1,212,472 1,224,477 1,260,491 1,320,515 1,440,561 
Nutrient excretion of dairy 
cows (1000 kg N) (*) 15,688 15,794 16,014 16,482 17,275 18,823 
Average manure pressure (dairy 
farms) 1.3009 1.3033 1.3136 1.3285 1.3439 1.3878 
lowest manure pressure (dairy 
farms) 0.0489 0.0528 0.0537 0.0572 0.0662 0.0766 
highest manure pressure (dairy 
farms) 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 
Average manure pressure (non- 
dairy farms) 1.0449 1.0468 1.0547 1.0661 1.0785 1.1126 
Lowest manure pressure (non- 
dairy farms) 0.0356 0.04 0.0404 0.0439 0.0553 0.0702 
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Highest manure pressure (non- 
dairy farms) 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 
Average manure pressure (all 
farms) 1.1035 1.1055 1.1139 1.1261 1.1391 1.1755 
(*) only dairy farms included in the sample 
 
Table 6 shows the effect of an increasing milk production on the experienced manure 
pressure. Because of the corresponding higher nitrogen production, farms face a higher 
manure pressure. However, the effect on the manure pressure is rather low, i.e. with a 
production growth of 5% compared to the current production, the average manure pressure on 
dairy farms will only increase to 1.3285 (+2.12%). A milk production growth of 20% will 
only cause an increase of manure pressure on dairy farms with 6.68% to 1.3878 € /kg N. The 
relation between production growth and average manure pressure on dairy farms is given in 
equation 3.  
XY *0047.03.1 +=  (R²= 0.9962) with(3) 
Y: average manure pressure on dairy farms (€ /kg N) 
X: dairy production growth (percentage of growth against current production) 
Equation 3 shows the positive relationship between growth in milk production and the 
average manure pressure on dairy farms. For each percentage of extra milk production, the 
average price of emission rights will increase with 0.47 eurocent.  
Because of the linear relation between milk production and nitrogen production, 
allocation costs per unit of milk can vary depending on cow-productivity. For high productive 
cows, the nitrogen excretion expressed per litre milk is lower than for low productive cows.  
For the reference cow-6250 the allocation costs per litre of milk produced, amounts for 
0.0208€. Assuming a production growth of 5%, the allocation costs per litre milk will rise to 
0.0213€ (+2.40%). This is only an increase of 0.5 eurocent per litre of milk. The allocation 
costs for cow-9375 come to 162.6 € and expressed per litre milk this is 0.0173 €. Again, 
assuming a production growth of 5%, the allocation costs per litre of milk will rise up to 
0.0177 € (+2.3%). This is only an increase of 0.4 eurocent per litre of milk. Thus, the manure 
allocation costs per litre milk will be lower for high productive cows. 
The comparison of the estimated profitability from literature and the current manure 
allocation costs suggests that emission rights prices will not stop the growth in milk 
production. The next section analyses the possible expansion based on an iterated simulation 
model.  
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Possible growth in the Flemish agricultural sector 
The previous topics have shown that allocation costs are rather small compared to the 
margins of milk production and thus will have a small influence on the total Flemish dairy 
production level. To see the effect of the increase in prices of emission rights on milk 
production, the iteration procedure is performed where for each step a production growth of 
2% is used. The main objective of this iterated simulation model is to check how many farms 
can increase their quota in spite of the increased manure disposal cost. Therefore, the increase 
of quota in the simulation model quota on a farm stops when the farm’ regional manure 
pressure becomes larger than the quota rent. We assume a fixed quota rent and without taking 
the manure disposal costs into account. Next to the manure pressure, the model takes also the 
limitation of available land into account by stopping the increase of quota when there is not 
enough farmland available for grazing. The maximum number of iterations is 20, meaning the 
farm in the model can grow 40% at most.  
The output of the simulations in table 7 show the results of 4 different assumptions on 
quota rent compared with the current production level. The highest assumed quota rent is 
based on Cathange et al. (2006) and because of the discussion on quota rent estimate we have 
chosen 3 lower quota rent levels too.   
 
Table 7: simulation results of a changing quota rent for milk quota 
 
Current 
production 
(MAP III) 
Assumed milk quota rents (euro/litre) 
0.0125 0.015 0.025 0.091 
Milk production (1000 
l) (*) 1,200,468 1,261,703 1,285,426 1,527,731 1,649,759 
Nutrient excretion of 
dairy cows (1000 kg 
N) (*) 
15,688 16,535 16,817 19,869 21,579 
Average manure 
pressure (dairy farms) 1.3009 1.3325 1.3401 1.4290 1.4826 
Lowest manure 
pressure (dairy farms) 0.0489 0.0932 0.0932 0.1289 0.1419 
Highest manure 
pressure (dairy farms) 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 
Average manure 
pressure (other farms) 1.0449 1.0718 1.078 1.1557 1.2005 
Lowest manure 
pressure (other farms) 0.0356 0.0553 0.0561 0.1024 0.1052 
 15
Highest manure 
pressure (other farms) 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 2.0833 
Average manure 
pressure (all farms) 1.1035 1.1314 1.1379 1.2182 1.2650 
Number of farms with 
end-of-iteration ‘land’ 
/ 112 117 227 336 
Number of farms with 
end-of-iteration 
‘manure pressure’ 
/ 4,129 3,932 1,806 0 
Number of farms with 
end-of-iteration 
/ 4,140 3,946 1,953 336 
Number of farms 
without end-of-
iteration 
/ 301 495 2,488 4,105 
 
Table 7 shows that the assumption on quota rents determine the results to a very large 
extent. A very high quota rent implies that a production increase pays off the increase of 
manure disposal cost. As a result, the limitation of available land is more binding than the 
manure disposal cost.  
With the estimated quota rent of 0.091 Euro per litre (Cathagne et al., 2006), non of 
the farms will stop to grow because of the manure pressure criteria. This means that, when 
this quota rent holds, farms would not be affected by the raising manure pressure and growth 
would be unlimited. Only the existence of other constraints or increasing cost as a 
consequence of increasing scale could prevent farms from growing. 
With a smaller margin, e.g. 0.0125€ / litre milk, after 20 iterations, only 6.8% of the 
farms is still able to grow. At this point the total milk production is increased with 5.1%. The 
margin of 0.0125€ / litre milk is however not very realistic because the cost of manure 
disposal is currently already higher on 68.5% of the farms. With a margin of 0.025€/litre 
milk, 56% of the farms could be able to cover the cost of manure disposal and has sufficient 
land to grow more than 40%. The sum of all increases topped at 40% results in a net increase 
of the total milk production of 27.3%. However, also the assumed margin of 0.025€/litre milk 
seems to be rather low because currently already 31.5% of the farms has a higher manure 
disposal cost than the assumed margin.  
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Conclusions 
This paper analyses the role of manure emission rights on the impact of quota 
enlargement or abolition. Milk quota fix the dairy production at farm level and at member-
state level while manure-allocation rights limit the use of nitrogen on cultivated land. Until 
now, the milk quota were the most binding constraint for milk production. But the soft-
landing of the milk quota regime or the complete abolition of milk quota raises the question at 
which production and profit level on the manure emission rights become binding for the 
Flemish dairy production. 
A production growth of 20% (!) results in an extra nitrogen production of 4.1% at 
Flemish level and a corresponding increase in emission right prices of 6.68% at dairy farms. 
Assuming a cow productivity of 6,250 litre milk a year, the 6.68% represents an average 
increase of 0.14 eurocent per litre of milk resulting in a total average cost of emission rights 
of 2.2 eurocent per litre. Comparing this emission right cost of 2.2 eurocent per litre to quota 
rent estimates for Belgium of 9.1 leads to the conclusion that the Flemish environmental 
policy represents a measurable cost of production but is not as binding and expensive as the 
dairy quota.   
Because of the rather small increase in allocation costs, one may expect that the 
manure regulation will not be the major determinant of the Flemish milk production. This 
result is confirmed by an iterative model that uses an initial assumed quota rent to simulate 
successive quota expansion. With only taking the dairy quota legislation, manure legislation 
and land constraints into account and with the assumption of the gross margin of 2.5 eurocent 
per litre of milk, 56% of the farms would be able to expand the production with more than 
40%. With an assumed margin of 9.1 eurocent per litre of milk, farm growth is only stopped 
because of the lack at pasture land on the farm.  
An increasing milk production would lead to increasing prices for emission rights. 
However, under perfect market conditions, the supplementary price is much lower than the 
profits achieved by producing extra milk. Thus in a purely economic point of view, the extra 
quantity of produced nutrients can not limit the quantity of produced milk, ceteris paribus. 
However three remarks have to be made. First, this is only a one-side approach of the 
total problem. The manure legislation regulates, besides the manure allocation, also the 
manure production. Animal production rights limits the total number of animals per farm. 
When a farm wants to expand his livestock, extra rights are necessary. Therefore the farmer 
has to purchase these rights from other (stopping) farms or he can, under certain conditions, 
apply for new rights to the government. These conditions are rather strict and deal mainly 
with complying with the manure processing rules at farm and at Flemish level. The restricted 
quantity of animal production rights and the strict rules to emit new rights can restrain the 
growth in milk production. Because the lack of data, this aspect is not analysed yet. 
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Another remark is that in our approach margins per litre of milk are assumed to be 
uniform and constant over all farms. To know the exact margins for each farm and how they 
would be affected by increasing production, individual FADN data should be used. However 
FADN data could not be linked with DAF or FLA data. 
The third remark is that use is made of the well-known perfect market assumption. In 
reality the market does not works perfect. Many deficit farmers choose not to accept manure 
from other farms in spite of the offered payments (Van der Straeten et al., 2008). Other 
farmers wish to accept the manure but do not find a surplus farm because of the non-
transparency of the market. This non-optimal functioning of the market can lift the prices for 
emission rights up.  
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